“The Impact of Housing Market Institutions on Labour Mobility: A European Cross-Country Comparison.” ENEPRI Working Paper No. 54, July 2007 by de Graaff, Thomas, & van Leuvensteijn, Michiel.
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 54/JULY 2007 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING MARKET INSTITUTIONS  
ON LABOUR MOBILITY 
A EUROPEAN CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
 
THOMAS DE GRAAFF 
AND MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN 
 
 
 
ENEPRI Working Papers constitute dissemination to a wider public of research undertaken and 
already published by ENEPRI partner member institutes on their own account. This paper was 
originally published by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, as CPB 
Discussion Paper No. 82, dated 19 June 2007. It is reprinted by ENEPRI with kind permission of 
the CPB. The views expressed are attributable only to the authors and not to any institution with 
which they are associated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN-13: 978-92-9079-731-9 
 
AVAILABLE FOR FREE DOWNLOADING FROM THE ENEPRI WEBSITE (HTTP://WWW.ENEPRI.ORG) 
OR THE CEPS WEBSITE (WWW.CEPS.BE) 
 
© COPYRIGHT 2007, THOMAS DE GRAAFF &  MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN  
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING MARKET INSTITUTIONS  
ON LABOUR MOBILITY: 
A EUROPEAN CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 54/July 2007 
Thomas de Graaff 
and Michiel van Leuvensteijn* 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the effects of housing market institutions on labour mobility. We 
construct durations for individuals leaving their current job for a different job, becoming 
unemployed or leaving the labour market, from a sample of households from 14 European 
countries in 1994-2001. We merge this data with country-specific housing market institutions, 
such as transaction taxes, and language and religion diversity. Similar to previous studies, 
estimated hazards indicate that home-ownership reduces job-to-job mobility as well as the 
probability to become unemployed or economically inactive on a individual level. However, a 
comparison between countries reveals that countries with high levels of homeownership rates 
also have high levels of unemployment. Therefore, this paper is able to reconcile the 
seemingly contrasting empirical results from both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic 
level. 
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5Summary
In this paper, we study the effect of home-ownership and housing market institutions on labour
market mobility from an international perspective. To this end, we used a large European micro
dataset from 1994 to 2001 together with institutional housing market variables measured on the
country level. We used a competing risk framework, with for current employment spells exit
destinations to jobs, unemployment and non-participation.
In this ﬁeld, there are empirical contributions both at the macroeconomic level and at the
microeconomic level. Exponents of the ﬁrst approach, such as Green and Hendershott (2001a)
for the USA and Nickell (1998) for the OECD countries ﬁnd indeed that home-ownership
constrains labour mobility and thus increases unemployment. However, most of the empirical
contributions on the microeconomic level, such as Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and
Munch et al. (2006), ﬁnd the opposite result. They ﬁnd that home-owners have stronger job
commitment than renters and thus that home-ownership limits job mobility, but also that the
probability to become unemployed is smaller for home-owners than for renters. Our contribution
is that we reconcile these two contradictory outcomes. We show that transaction costs in the
housing market have an indirect and direct effect on labour mobility. Transaction costs in the
housing market diminish the attractiveness of buying residences. On an aggregate level, this
causes job commitment to decrease because of lower home-ownership rates, which enhances job
mobility. However, there is also a direct effect. Transaction costs hamper job mobility to jobs
outside the home region. It is only attractive for employees to accept a job outside their home
region if they are compensated for these transaction costs. This diminishes the probability to
change jobs and creates inﬂexibility in labour markets. The two effects together explain why on
the individual level we ﬁnd that home-ownership reduces unemployment, but on the aggregate
level home-ownership seems to increase unemployment.
71 Introduction
In a comparison of the labour markets of the US and Europe, some striking differences emerge.
To start with, the economies of Europe display much higher levels of long-term unemployment.
And secondly, unemployment is more unevenly spread across European regions than across US
regions. In a series of papers in the 1990s, Oswald (1997, 1999) showed that the usual suspects,
such as high unemployment beneﬁts, high taxes on labour, and the presence of strong unions,
could not explain these variations in unemployment rates sufﬁciently.
Oswald suggested an alternative driver for high unemployment rates: namely,
home-ownership. Indeed, at the national level he found that countries with high home-ownership
ratio’s in 1990, such as New Zealand, Australia, Ireland and Spain, also suffered from high
unemployment rates. And where home-ownership rates increased in most European countries
since the 1960s, home-ownership in the United States actually decreased. Furthermore, in terms
of explanatory power, Oswald found that the degree of home-ownership shows a high correlation
with unemployment rates, above the impact of social beneﬁts duration, union coverage and the
like.
In this ﬁeld, there are empirical contributions both at the macroeconomic level and at the
microeconomic level. Exponents of the ﬁrst approach, such as Green and Hendershott (2001a)
for the USA and Nickell (1998) for the OECD countries ﬁnd indeed that home-ownership
constrains labour mobility and thus increases unemployment. However, most of the empirical
contributions on the microeconomic level, such as Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and
Munch et al. (2006), ﬁnd the opposite result. They conclude that home-owners have stronger job
commitment than renters and thus that home-ownership limits job mobility, but also that the
probability to become unemployed is smaller for home-owners than for renters.
Our contribution is that we reconcile these two contradictory outcomes. We show that
transaction costs in the housing market have an indirect and direct effect on labour mobility.
Transaction costs in the housing market diminish the attractiveness of buying residences. On an
aggregate level, this causes job commitment to decrease because of lower home-ownership rates,
which enhances job mobility indirectly. However, there is also a direct effect. Transaction costs
hampers job mobility to jobs outside the home region. It is only attractive for employees to
accept a job outside their home region if they are compensated for these transaction costs. This
decreases the probability to change jobs and creates inﬂexibility in labour markets. The two
effects together explain why on the individual level we ﬁnd that home-ownership reduces the
probability to become unemployed, but on the aggregate level home-ownership seems to
increase umemployment.
For our analysis, we use a longitudinal dataset of employees for 14 European countries for
the period 1994–2001. This dataset is combined with information on housing institutions,
religion and language diversity. It provides us the opportunity to identify effects of transaction
9costs not visible at the national level. Because the dataset contains multiple job spells, we are
able to correct for spurious relationships and identify effects of home-ownership on labour
mobility, and reverse. Both movements on the housing market and on the labour market are used
to estimate the impact of home-ownership and transaction costs on job mobility as well as the
probability of becoming unemployed. To this end, we use data collected by the European
Community, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). In the ECHP, about 130
thousand individuals are followed over time. These individuals can change between jobs,
between unemployment and employment, between homes and between regions. In modeling
these transitions, several variables in the ECHP may be useful: socio-economic characteristics,
household characteristics, home-ownership, job tenure and what workers do after their current
job spell.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section deals with an overview of the theoretical
and empirical contributions that have been made to this particular literature concerning the
impact of home-ownership on labour market mobility. Section 3 discusses brieﬂy the modelling
framework and econometric techniques. Subsequently, Section 4 offers an exposition of the data
we use and the implementation of the model laid out in the previous section. Section 5 presents
the empirical results. The last section concludes and offers lines for further research.
102 Theory and Review
The theoretical literature on the relationship between home-ownership on the one hand and job
mobility and unemployment on the other hand does not predict a clear ex-ante outcome with
respect to the direction of this relationship. From a macro-perspective, Green and Hendershott
(2001b), e.g., offer some additional explanations for the fact that home-ownership may cause
reduced labour market mobility. Firstly, when the economy is in a downfall, housing becomes a
very illiquid asset, causing home-owners to be reluctant to sell their house and search for
appropriate jobs outside their local labour market. Secondly, high interest rates may cause
home-owners to be locked in as well, with similar consequences for residential mobility. And
ﬁnally, high transaction costs usually associated with home-ownership may also cause reduced
residential mobility. However, theoretically from a microeconomic perspective, Dohmen (2005),
who studied directly the consequences of home-ownership in a theoretical framework with
search and moving costs, concludes that high-skilled workers are more mobile than low-skilled
workers and that home-owners are less mobile than renters, ceteris paribus. However,
high-skilled home-owners may be more mobile than low-skilled renters if the income loss
associated with unemployment exceeds the income loss associated with moving house. Along
the same line of thought, Van Vuuren (2005) analysed the relationship between expected labour
market outcomes and the housing market in a search theoretical framework, and argued that the
empirically often observed positive correlation at the micro level between labour market
mobility and housing tenure boils down to an endogeneity problem. Regarding the individual
relation between residential and job mobility, several modelling frameworks exist, mostly in the
context of job search theory (see, e.g., the study of Van den Berg and Gorter, 1997). Theoretical
predictions for the impact of residential mobility on job mobility are less ambiguous than for the
impact of housing tenure. If workers face substantial (monetary) costs in changing residence, job
mobility is severely hampered. These moving costs are often caused by housing tenure, but may
also stem from household characteristics (like coordination problems in two-earner households
in combination with higher commuting costs, as in Van Ommeren (1996)).
Because of the theoretical ambiguity, the relationship between home-ownership and labour
mobility and unemployment is mainly an empirical issue. Macroeconomic and microeconomic
empirical analyses show however contradicting outcomes. On a macroeconomic level, several
contributions show that home-ownership increases unemployment. Nickell (1998) analyzes the
relationship between home-ownership and unemployment, using a panel of 20 OECD countries,
from 1989 to 1994. With these data, Nickell shows that unemployment is (seemingly) positively
correlated with home-ownership, with an elasticity of 0.13. Green and Hendershott (2001b)
estimate an elasticity of 0.18, using aggregated data for the different states of the United States
for the period 1970–1990. This estimate is close to the estimate of Oswald (1999), with an
elasticity equal to 0.2. He analyzes the relationship between home-ownership and
11unemployment, using panel time series data of 19 OECD countries, from 1960 to 1990. This
relationship is not only found between countries, but also between the regions of France, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, the US and the UK. In line with these results, Murphy et al. (2006) show
that strong housing market conditions can prevent movement since expensive housing can deter
migrants and make commuting more attractive as an alternative to movement.
Oswald (1997) posed ﬁve possible mechanisms to explain this positive relation between
unemployment and home-ownership. All of these can actually be related to the linkage between
reduced residential mobility, home-ownership and inefﬁcient labour markets (as already
mentioned by Blanchard and Katz, 1992). The ﬁrst mechanism concerns the direct effect of high
moving costs when owning a house. Given all tax regulations, mortgage and notary fees, moving
residence for home-owners is far more expensive than for renters. This implies that
home-owners are reluctant to move even when labour market opportunities elsewhere – such as a
better job match or even a job at all – are more attractive. Secondly, housing markets dominated
by home-ownership tend to impede newcomers (read youngsters) on the housing markets to ﬁnd
appropriate homes close to their preferred jobs. Note that this argument is a particular form of
the spatial mismatch as introduced by Kain (1968), where frictions on the housing market lead to
less (suitable) job matches. The third argument Oswald brings forward is actually an indirect
variant on the ﬁrst one. If less people are mobile, an economy becomes more inefﬁcient which in
the long term is harmful for production and the number of job vacancies. A fourth argument
points to the fact that home-owners are more likely to prevent entrepreneurs to settle in
residential areas than renters, mainly because their incentives to form political lobby groups are
stronger. Finally, Oswald mentions that home-owners tend to commute over longer distances
compared to renters. This probably leads to more congestion, which is harmful to the economy
as a whole and causes job matching to be less efﬁcient. This last hypothesis follows directly
from the ﬁrst hypothesis. home-owners are less mobile and thus have to increase their search
space when looking for a suitable job.
Contrarily to the ﬁndings presented above, several microeconomic contributions show that
home-ownership actually diminishes the probability to become unemployed. Van Leuvensteijn
and Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2006) have analysed the effect of home-ownership on
respectively job mobility and unemployment for respectively the Netherlands and Denmark.
They ﬁnd no effects on job mobility but identify a small negative effect on the probability to
acquire a job outside their local area. Van der Vlist (2001) studied the Dutch situation as well
and concludes that home-ownership has a small positive effect on changing jobs. Barcelo (2003)
analysed for ﬁve major European countries the effects of home-ownership on unemployment and
found that owners are more reluctant to move than renters. Using U.S. household data, Green
and Hendershott (2001a) found that unemployed home-owners indeed ﬁnd jobs at a slower rate
than renters, but only with an impact of an eighth of what is found for aggregate data.
Following Dietz and Haurin (2003)), the conclusion from the above literature is that the
12empirical results concerning the effect of home-ownership on labour market mobility is
ambiguous. It seems that, in general, studies using micro data tend to reject the Oswald
hypothesis – i.e., home-ownership hampers labour mobility and increases unemployment –
while studies using macro data support it. This might point to the existence of a spurious relation
at the macro level or omitted variables at the micro level.
As mentioned above, our paper adds to this empirical literature by showing that if one
focuses on transaction costs, like transfer taxes, in the housing market instead of
home-ownership, the seemingly contradictory outcomes on both the micro- and macro-economic
level can be reconciled. Within European countries, e.g., there is a large variation between tax
relief and real estate agent fees. Both are most likely to reduce residential mobility and thus
should have a negative effect on labour market performance. Apart from housing market
institutions that deal directly with transaction costs, there are institutions that deal with the easy
of buying a house. In Europe, e.g, most countries allow interest rates on mortgages to be (partly)
deducted from income taxes, which should have a positive impact on home-ownership, and thus
affects labour market performance indirectly.
13143 The Modeling Framework
To study labour market mobility, we focus on the probability of ending a job and the various exit
destinations. We assume that workers only end their current job for three possible reasons. First,
they may ﬁnd another job (whether more suited for the worker or not). Secondly, workers may
become unemployed. And thirdly, workers may leave the labour force altogether because of
retirement, raising a child, looking after disabled family members, study purposes and so on. If
labour mobility is hampered, it might show up in two ways. First, a worker may remain longer in
her current job and move at a slower rate to a new one. This indicates that a worker is hampered
in his or her upward career mobility. Secondly, a worker may end up faster in unemployment or
leave the labour force faster. This happens when a worker faces difﬁculties in ﬁnding a job close
to his of her residential location and when it is too costly to move to areas with more attractive
job opportunities. Reﬂecting the Oswald hypothesis we incorporate individual home-ownership
to test whether this adequately measures residential mobility and to what extent it affects job
duration and exit destination.
The model we construct consists of a competing risk duration framework for the various exit
rates of employment in combination with a discrete choice model for the probability of buying or
renting a house. The fundamental assumption we make is that the decision to buy or rent a house
is correlated with labour market behaviour through observed and unobserved components. First,
as mentioned above, we allow labour market mobility to be directly related with housing tenure,
by incorporating home-ownership in the job duration model. This entails a direct test whether
home-owners are more or less mobile on the labour market relative to renters. Simultaneously,
we allow for unobserved heterogeneity to control for those unobserved factors that drive both job
mobility and housing tenure. In our case, unobserved heterogeneity may occur because of
unobserved skills and job commitment. E.g., workers with short-term contracts are less likely to
buy a house compared with workers with tenure. And workers who intend to leave their current
job in six months to travel around the world are less likely to buy a house as well.
To capture the effect of housing market institutions, we include country-speciﬁc institutional
variables, such as taxes on transferring residence and language and religion variables, in both the
labour market and the housing model. Variables that are hypothesised to affect the labour market
indirectly via the housing market, such as income tax deduction, are only included in the
housing model. The intuition behind this construction is that country speciﬁc institutional
variables and home-ownership may simultaneously affect labour market behaviour. Both serve
then as a proxy for the degree of residential mobility, although the housing institution variables
are measured rather crudely (on a country level) and home-ownership may incorporate other
effects on labour market mobility (such as a positive one due to job commitment).
The modeling approach we adopt in this paper closely resembles that of Van Leuvensteijn
and Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2006), and to a certain extent that of Bover et al. (2002), so
15not much attention is spent to technical details. The ﬁrst subsection deals with the econometric
model. Subsequently, we spend some attention to the issue of identiﬁcation. The last subsection
combines all components and speciﬁes the complete likelihood function to be estimated.
3.1 The econometric model
To model the probability of leaving a job we use a duration analysis framework. The basic
concept in duration analysis is the hazard rate θ, which is deﬁned here as the rate that workers
leave their current job in the time interval [T,T +dt] given that these workers occupy their job at
least up to T. The probability that someone leaves employment within an interval dt after t can
be denoted as Pr(T <t < T +dt|t ≥ T) (see, e.g, Lancaster, 1990). Dividing this probability by
dt, we get the average probability of leaving employment per unit time period:
θb(t) =
Pr(T <t < T +dt|t ≥ T)
dt
, (3.1)
where the subscript b ∈ {e,u,o} indicates the exit destination, which in our case are:
employment (e), unemployment (u) and out of the labour force (o). Note that if dt → 0, we have
an instantaneous rate of leaving per unit time period at t.
We use a proportional hazard rate speciﬁcation, indicating that we assume that the impact of
individual characteristics are proportional to the impact of the elapsed time of the job spell.
Further, each destination speciﬁc hazard is a function of a set of observed characteristics – such
as age, sex, being married and education, but also country-speciﬁc housing market institutions,
such as transaction costs –, which may vary over time, Xt, a time varying indicator for
ownership status, ht, a function which measures duration dependence for a speciﬁc exit
destination, λb(t), and unobserved characteristics, νb. Thus, the hazard rate of a speciﬁc
destination may be written as:
θb(t|Xt,ht,νb) = exp(Xtβb+λb(t)+γbht +νb). (3.2)
Often, λb(t) is also referred to as the baseline hazard. We adopt here a nonparametric ﬂexible
speciﬁcation in the form of a piecewise constant speciﬁcation. So, duration dependence is
assumed to be constant within duration intervals.
We assume the dichotomous home-ownership variable ht to follow the following logit
speciﬁcation:
Pr(ht = 1|Xt,Yt,µh) =
exp(Xtβh +Ytδh +µh)
1+exp(Xtβh +Ytδh +µh)
,
Pr(ht = 0|Xt,Yt,µh) = 1−Pr(ht = 1|Xt,Yt,µh), (3.3)
where h is one, if the worker owns his current residence and zero, if the worker rents it. Yt
denotes a set of variables that characterises the choice between buying or renting a house, but
which does not inﬂuence labour market mobility directly. Xt consists of the same set of
16variables, which are used to model job duration spells. Finally, to account for unobserved
heterogeneity, we incorporate an additional unobserved random component, denoted with µh.
In contrast to regression models, unobserved heterogeneity causes an estimation bias in
duration modeling. Therefore, several modeling approaches have been developed to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. We adopt here the often used nonparametric approach proposed by
Heckman and Singer (1984). Basically, this boils down to the assumption of a discrete
distribution, denoted G, with a prespeciﬁed number (say K) of mass points. Moreover, we allow
νe, νu, νo and µh to be correlated. Together with K mass points, this leaves us with 4K possible
combinations between the mass points, each with a seperate probability, which have to be
estimated simultaneously. When using constant terms the distribution is identiﬁed by
normalising the ﬁrst point of support to {0,0,0,0}, so that the number of mass points to be
estimated reduces to (K−1)×4.1
As shown above, our model consists of two parts; the housing model and the job duration
model. If not for the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity components, these two
parts can be estimated separately. Allowing for correlation creates a mixture model which has to
be integrated out over the entire distribution of unobserved variables, G{νe, νu, νo, µh} (see
Van den Berg, 2001, for more details on the application of mixture distributions in duration
models).
3.2 Identiﬁcation
A key issue in the literature on home-ownership and labour market mobility is the identiﬁcation
of the causal effect. home-ownership may cause a change in labour market mobility, but the
reverse relation is – a priori – just as likely. Those workers who have good prospects on long job
spells (or on lower probabilities to end up unemployed) are the ones most likely to buy a house.
The literature distinguished two approaches to deal with this endogeneity. The ﬁrst one is using
instrumental variables, where variables that affect home-ownership but not labour market
mobility are incorporated in the housing model to control for endogeneity. Van Leuvensteijn and
Koning (2004) have proposed to use regional home-ownership as an instrument while Munch
et al. (2006) used home-ownership of the parents in 1980 and the proportion of home-owners in
the municipality where the individual was born. Usually, however, the impact of these
instrumental variables is rather low, indicating that these models are already fairly well identiﬁed
or that the performance of the chosen instruments is rather weak.
We choose a second approach by using multiple spells for identiﬁcation, cf. Van Vuuren
(2005) and Munch et al. (2006), where the latter spend much attention to the intuition behind
this (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003, for a formal argumentation for this identiﬁcation
1 Note that this leaves the number of probabilities to be estimated still up to 4K.
17strategy). To summarize their arguments, it is not diffult to see that using repeated observations
on one individual removes all interpersonal variation.2 Thus, if there are multiple job spells
available for a speciﬁc individual and if her housing tenure status varies as well over these spelle,
then the effect of housing tenure on labour market mobility is theoretically identiﬁed.3 Thus,
identiﬁcation is then based on a subsample with multiple spells and changes in housing tenure
status, where the existence of multiple spells ensure that the unobserved heterogeneity
components capture the ‘within person’ effects (Munch et al., 2006).
3.3 The log-likelihood function
To construct the log-likelihood we introduce some additional notation. Conform Lancaster
(1990), let there be B binary destination vectors db, where db is one when there is a transition to
state b and zero otherwise. Because we do not observe all job duration spells to end, we model
right-censored job duration spells as well. We do this by theoretically treating right-censoring as
an additional dummy state. Thus, the set of possible destination vectors B now consists of
employment, unemployment, out-of-labour force, and censoring.4 Thus, given that individuals
have an elapsed duration time T and job exit destination b, and conditional on their observed
characteristics, housing tenure and mass point νb, the log-likelihood for job durations may be
written as:
``T(φb|T,b,Xt,ht,νb) =
B
å
b=1

dblnθb(T)−
Z T
0
θb(t)dt

, (3.4)
where φb is shorthand notation for the parameter vector {βb,λb(t),γb}. Note that the ﬁrst part of
equation (3.4) displays the hazard rate of the transition to destination b, while the second part
denotes the probability of survival of the job spell until time T.
The log-likelihood of owning or renting a house ht during the total length of the job spell
conditional on the observed characteristics and country speciﬁc housing market variables
follows immediately from the logit equation (3.3), and is given by:
``h(φh|ht,Xt,Yt,µh) =
T
å
t=1
ht ln(Pr(ht = 1|Xt,Yt,µh))+(1−ht)ln(Pr(ht = 0|Xt,Yt,µh)),
(3.5)
where φh denotes the parameter vector {βh,δh}. The joint log-likelihood is now formed by
multiplying the likelihoods of (3.4) and (3.5) – given the discrete unobserved heterogeneity
2 However, as one referee rightfully observed, this is only true if unobserved individual heterogeneity is constant over time.
Because in our case of job and housing mobility this assumption might be a bit strong, we incorporate as many variables
as we can in models (3.2) and (3.3) that might reﬂect changes in preference structures, i.e. because of life-cycle effects.
3 That is, apart from possible changes in her preference structure, which may well arise if, e.g., life cycle effects are not
properly accounted for by the exogeneous variables.
4 To avoid confusion, we do not model censoring as another competing risk. In other words, transitions to state b do not
include censoring, while the destination vector db does include censoring.
18distribution –, and integrating out over the entire distribution of mass points G{νe,νu,νo,µh}.
Allowing for the presence of multiple job spells, the joint log-likelihood for the contribution of
an individual i can be written as:
``Th,i = ln
ZZZZ Nj
Õ
j=1
exp
h
``Tj(φb)+``hj(φh)
i
dG{νe,νu,νo,µh}, (3.6)
where, j (j ∈ {1,...,Nj}) stands for spell j and Nj for the total amount of job spells of
individual i. The log-likelihood in (3.6) basically states that the log-likelihood of job duration as
in (3.4) and the log-likelihood of owning or renting a house as in (3.5) has to be integrated out
over the distribution of mass points, which raises an additional difﬁculty in the sense that we do
not have to optimize over a set of parameters, but over a probability distribution as well. To solve
this issue we apply an Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm to solve for the parameters of
equation (3.6) we are interested in. Appendix A gives further details of the implementation of
the EM-algorithm for this speciﬁc application.
19204 Data and Implementation
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The data set used in this analyses is derived from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP). The ECHP-survey is based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual
interviewing of a representative panel of households and individuals in each country. The
questionnaire covers a wide range of topics like income, health, education, housing,
demographics and employment characteristics, which makes this database especially suitable for
our analysis. The ECHP covers the period 1994 to 2001. In the ﬁrst wave, i.e. in 1994, a sample
of some 60,500 nationally representative households were interviewed in the 12 member states
at that juncture, which equals to approximately 130,000 adults aged 16 years and over. Austria,
Finland and Sweden joined the project in respectively 1995, 1996 and 1997.5
For our analysis, we need to construct job spells’ durations and exit destination upon job
termination. For this purpose, we use the survey’s questions to individuals to report on their last
year’s individual activity states on a monthly basis.6 We avoid left-censoring of job spells by
only selecting observed job durations. However, we do observe a fair amount of rightcensored or
incomplete spells (about 33.9 of our observations). Furthermore, due to the panel structure of the
database, we are able to observe multiple job spells for each individual. Simultaneously, a set of
individual characteristics, including job history, demographic variables and residential history is
available including tenure on the housing market.
5 Data for Sweden has been derived from the Swedish Living Conditions Survey and transformed into ECHP format.
6 Except for the Netherland and Sweden. For the Netherlands it was still possible to construct monthly activity states from
other questions, for Sweden it was not. Therefore, we had to drop Sweden from the ﬁnal estimation. Because of this
procedure, small job spells may have been unrecorded for the Netherlands resulting in an underestimation of the number
of job spells and an overestimation in the length of the average job spell. Further, information on out-of-labour force exits
were not available for the Netherlands. Because it does not affect the other exit rates, we left that competing risk out for
the Netherlands.
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7Table 4.1 offers the means of the variables of the selected countries in the ECHP dataset. The
spells presented are job duration spells and are not yet corrected for right-sensoring. Clearly,
there is much variation between the countries in terms of the length of job durations, age
structure, educational attainment and household structure. In most countries, average job
duration is about 2.5–3.5 years, with the notably exceptions of Spain and Finland, which have an
average job duration lower than 2 years.
In terms of job exit destination, most spells end in a job move (apart from censoring),
especially in Germany, Austria and Denmark, while in countries such as France and Spain,
workers end up relatively frequent in unemployment. Finally, employees in Ireland and Finland
exit the labour market relatively frequent when their current job is ended. Due to the fact that
some exit destinations – in particular self-employment – are not taken into consideration, all exit
destinations’ means (including censoring) do not sum up to one.
Tenure varies enormously among countries. Most employees from Ireland, Spain and Greece
are home-owners, while in France and Germany, employees are mostly renters. To analyse the
impact of various housing institutions, we use additional – aggregate – data information on
residential mobility or the probability of buying residences. Our primary source of information
is Belot and Ederveen (2005). They constructed several indicators that reﬂect differences in
various types of transaction costs between countries. The following ﬁve indicators are
incorporated in our dataset:
• Tax
This indicator displays the percentage of the property’s value paid by home-owners for
transferring residences. Besides transfer taxes, this indicator also contains registration duties,
notary fees and mortgage fees and the average real estate agent’s fee as percentage of a
property’s value. Often, these latter fees are subject to negotiation between the real estate agent
and the buyer or the seller. Usually, it is not compulsory to involve a real estate agent in the
residential transaction.
• Aggregate home-ownership
This indicator shows the percentage of home-ownership within a country (as opposed to renting).
Note that this variable actually reﬂects the originals Oswald hypothesis. Moreover, this variable
may capture unobserved country-speciﬁc effects in the choice between buying or renting a
house. Different than the other indicators, this indicator shows intertemporal variation. It is
based upon the dataset of Belot and Ederveen (2005) and upon additional data from Eurostat.
• Mortgage interest deductability
This (binary) indicator is taken from Van den Noord and Heady (2001) and shows whether
interest payments of mortgage loans are deductable from the personal income tax. Most
countries allow for such tax deduction to some extent, with the exception of some larger
countries like France, Germany and the UK.
23• Language diversity
This indicator measures on a scale from 0 to 1 the variety in languages (or dialects) within a
country. We incorporate this variable because it may proxy the ease of moving to another region
within a country. The particular variable we use here is the Ethnologue indicator, which actually
uses the variation in local dialect. If si,A denotes the share of the population speaking dialect i in
country A, then the language diversity indicator is calculated as: languageA = 1−åis2
i,A.
• Religion diversity
This indicator measures on a scale from 0 to 1 the variety in religion within a country. The
argument is the same as for the previous indicator. If religion is rather heterogeneous within a
country, people are hypothesized to be less inclined to move between regions. The indicator is
calculated as: religionA = 1−åis2
i,A, where si,A denotes the share of the population with religion
i in country A.
To gain insight in the variation of these institutions between European countries, Figure 4.1
displays the level of the ‘Tax’ indicator – separated in direct tax on transferring residences and
mortgage fees – for the countries in our dataset.
Figure 4.1 Taxation for moving residence and real estate agent fee for several European countries. (Source:
Belot and Ederveen, 2005)
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Residential movers in The United Kingdom seem to best off, with transaction costs of around
4%, while movers in Italy face the highest transactions costs (19%). Some geographical pattern
is discernable. Southern European countries (together with Belgium and Luxembourg) have
24relatively high transaction costs for moving residence compared to Northern countries, such as
the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom (together with Austria). Usually, direct taxes
are higher then real estate agents fees with the exception of Denmark and the United Kingdom.7
Figure 4.2 gives the geographical and intertemporal variation in aggregate ownership rates.
Figure 4.2 Home-ownership rate for European countries between 1994-2001. Source: Eurostat
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Although a geographical pattern is more difﬁcult to discern, again it seems that Southern
European countries together with Ireland and the United Kingdom have higher home-ownership
rates than northern Europe. Moreover, there are some indications that countries with generous
welfare systems, such as the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the Netherlands, have low
home-ownership rates, although this pattern is less clear. Most countries show a rising
homeowernship rate between 1994 and 2001. Especially Denmark (+14%), Belgium (+7%),
Austria (+7%), France (+8%), and the Netherlands (+7%) witnessed a rapid increase in
home-ownership during this period.
Finally, Figure 4.3 depicts the variation in language and religion diversity between countries.
Unsurprisingly, most variation in language can be found in countries like Belgium, Italy, and
Spain, the least in Portugal, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Religious diversiﬁcation can be
found especially in the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherland – countries which happen
to have large populations of immigrants – and display a more heterogeneous picture. Moreover,
7 Interestingly, in the United States real estate agent fees are about three times higher than transaction taxes.
25Figure 4.3 Language and religion diversity within several European countries. (Source: Belot and Ederveen,
2005)
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countries like Germany and the Netherlands have large populations of both Protestants and
Roman Catholics, where the former is usually divided in various religious subgroups.
In terms of demography, countries like Ireland and Austria seem to have a much younger age
structure than countries like France, Greece or Belgium, with the Scandinavian countries
somewhere in between. The educational level seems to be highest in countries like Belgium and
Denmark and lowest in Portugal and Austria, although it is difﬁcult to compare these variables
directly because they have all been measured differently. Most countries display a similar pattern
with regard to the number of children living in the household, Ireland and Austria are here the
exceptions. The marital status shows more variation across countries. In Belgium about 72% of
the employees in our sample live with a partner, while in Ireland this ﬁgure drops to 46% (which
is remarkable given the number of children in the household). The variable describing whether
the spouse is employed or not, displays a huge variation as well. In countries like Spain, Italy,
Greece and Ireland the spouse usually is not employed, while in the Scandinavian countries, UK,
Belgium, and France one out of two spouses has an income.
4.2 Implementation
We have monthly information about each worker’s status and yearly information on all other
characteristics. Thus, job tenure is measured in months and housing tenure in years. In terms of
26exit destinations, we denote a job move when a worker changes job or apprenticeship,
unemployment only when the next activity is labelled unemployment, and out-of-the labour
force when a worker becomes retired, spends his or her time to (unpaid) housework activities, is
doing community or military service, or ends up in other activities that are economically inactive.
We use individual and household characteristics to control as much as possible for
individual, household and life-cycle effects that might inﬂuence the event of leaving the current
job spell apart from mobility effects. First, we use age cohort dummies as age controls rather
well for live-cycle effects that might cause, e.g., individuals to enter an out-of-labour force
status. Secondly, gender is included to control for the fact that females have a higher probability
to look after the children and thus might leave a current job spell faster to become economically
inactive. The same accounts for the dummies that control for the presence of children of
different ages within the household. We include education – measured as low, medium and high
– to control for the fact that higher educated workers earn higher wages and therefore show
higher home-ownership rates. Here, medium education denotes the secondary level and high
education a university degree or above. Having a partner in the household and whether the
partner earns an income is included, as these households usually have higher probabilities to
own a house as well. Finally, whether the worker rents or owns a house is included to test the
Oswald hypothesis on a micro-level.
As variables that measure residential mobility we include the above discussed ‘Tax’,
‘Aggregate home-ownership’, ‘Mortgage interest deductability’, ‘Language diversity’, and
‘Religion Diversity’ variables. However, because aggregate home-ownership and mortgage
interest deductability are assumed to inﬂuence only housing tenure and not job mobility, they are
only included in the housing model. Note that possibilities for identiﬁcation based upon these
two variables are feable at best. Basically, identiﬁcation is done mostly upon the availability of
multiple spells, beside the functional form and the above mentioned country-speciﬁc variables.
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of multiple spells in our dataset.
There is a fair amount of multiple spells present in the data. More than 30% of the observed
workers displays two or more employment spells.
All variables are measured at the moment the workers leaves his or her current job. As
mentioned above, to control for duration dependence we adopt a nonparametric ﬂexible
speciﬁcation. Here, duration dependence is assumed to be constant within the following duration
intervals: within one year, between one and three years, between three and ﬁve years, and above
ﬁve years. A speciﬁc approach to incorpote such a nonparametric speciﬁcation is shown in
Lancaster (1990).
Finally, we set the number of mass points (K) at two, which – in theory – leaves us with 16
probabilities to be estimated. However, experiments with subsamples show that a smaller
amount of these probabilities is not only considerably faster, but gives (almost) the same
estimation results as well. We therefore only use seven of these probabilities.
27Figure 4.4 Number and distribution of multiple spells over individuals
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1 11 21 31 41
Number of employment spells over individuals
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
285 Empirical Results
5.1 Results
Before analysing the estimation results, the empirical nonparametric (Kaplan-Meyer) survival
functions provide a ﬁrst insight in the impact of home-ownership on job duration (see, e.g.,
Kiefer, 1988). Figure 5.1 presents these survival functions for job to job transitions and
transitions to unemployment.
Figure 5.1 Kaplan-Meyer survival rates for (a) job to job transitions, and (b) job to unemployment transitions,
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From Figure 5.1, it follows that there is a general positive impact of home-ownership on the
survival rate of the current job spell, regardless the exit destination. Thus, empirically,
home-owners are less likely to end up in unemployment.8 Further, they also have a tendency to
change jobs less frequently than renters. However, these results do not shed light on the direction
of the causal relation between home-ownership and job mobility, but merely depict their
correlation. To look into this relation we estimate the joint model of residential and job mobility
as given in equation (3.6).
In Table 5.1 the results of the joint model are presented. To facilitate the estimation we
reduced our sample to a random subsample containing 10% of total observations. This
subsample itself still consists of about 23,000 observations.
Looking ﬁrst at the competing risk model, we ﬁnd that most estimated coefﬁcients of the
competing hazard rate model are signiﬁcant and comform intuition. Our main variable of
8 Note the drop after 8 years in both Kaplan-Meyer survival functions. These are caused by the end of the ECHP survey in
2001. Some spells may, however, last longer than 8 years, because these spells started before the survey (and their
starting date was recorded).Furthermore, the Kaplan-Meyer survival function for job to non-participation transitions
provides a similar picture as those presented in Figure 5.1.
29Table 5.1 Joint estimation of housing and competing risk modela
θb(t)
Variable Prob. home-owner Employment Unemployment Non-participation
Constant − 5.675 (0.18)
Age dummies (baseline: age < 25)
Age 25–35 − 0.183 (0.05) − 0.480 (0.03) 0.070 (0.05) − 0.762 (0.05)
Age 35–45 0.450 (0.06) − 0.986 (0.04) − 0.224 (0.06) − 1.488 (0.06)
Age > 45 0.952 (0.06) − 1.316 (0.04) − 0.489 (0.06) − 0.913 (0.05)
Female − 0.128 (0.03) 0.175 (0.02) 0.128 (0.04) 0.688 (0.04)
Education dummies (baseline: education = low)
Education medium 0.280 (0.04) − 0.064 (0.03) − 0.271 (0.04) 0.024 (0.04)
Education high 0.256 (0.04) − 0.316 (0.04) − 0.636 (0.05) 0.030 (0.05)
Spouse employed 0.654 (0.04) − 0.255 (0.04) − 0.382 (0.05) − 0.188 (0.05)
Living with partner − 0.293 (0.05) 0.042 (0.04) − 0.004 (0.05) − 0.065 (0.05)
Children within the household (baseline: no children ≤ 18)
Children < 11 0.128 (0.04) − 0.085 (0.03) 0.045 (0.04) 0.187 (0.04)
Children 12–15 0.501 (0.06) − 0.134 (0.04) 0.063 (0.06) − 0.133 (0.06)
Children 16–18 0.416 (0.06) 0.265 (0.04) 0.304 (0.06) 0.241 (0.05)
Home-owner − 0.190 (0.03) − 0.280 (0.04) − 0.145 (0.04)
Tax (%) − 0.031 (0.01) − 0.021 (0.00) − 0.011 (0.01) − 0.048 (0.01)
Aggregation homeowers (%) 0.052 (0.00)
Interest deduction 0.092 (0.04)
Language diversity 0.151 (0.13) 0.564 (0.09) 0.814 (0.12) 0.313 (0.12)
Religion diversity 0.821 (0.12) − 0.006 (0.07) − 0.375 (0.10) − 1.270 (0.09)
Baseline Hazard
0–1 year − 2.781 (0.07) − 3.932 (0.11) − 2.993 (0.09)
1–3 years − 4.797 (0.08) − -5.829 (0.12) − 4.658 (0.10)
3–5 years − 4.910 (0.09) − 5.952 (0.13) − 4.694 (0.11)
> 5 years − 4.831 (0.09) − 5.312 (0.12) − 4.267 (0.10)
Unobserved heterogeneity distribution
Mass point 4.140 (0.03) 0.638 (0.03) 0.531 (0.04) 0.413 (0.04)
Probabilities
Pr(G = {0,0,0,0}) 0.244
Pr(G = {0,1,0,0}) 0.000
Pr(G = {0,0,1,0}) 0.000
Pr(G = {0,0,0,1}) 0.000
Pr(G = {1,0,0,0}) 0.523
Pr(G = {0,1,1,1}) 0.070
Pr(G = {1,1,1,1}) 0.158
Mean log-likelihood − 3.879
Number of spells 22,819
a standard errors between parentheses
30interest, being a home-owner, reduces the probability to change jobs signiﬁcantly (risk reduction
17%). This result is very similar to outcomes of previous microeconomic studies (see, e.g., Van
Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006).9 Further, home-ownership ensures that
workers face smaller probabilities to become unemployed (risk reduction 24%) or
non-participant (risk reduction 14%). Basically, this conﬁrms the hypotheses of Dietz and
Haurin (2003) and van Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004), that home-owners have larger
job-commitment than renters. This can partly be explained by the substantial monetary
transaction costs when being forced to sell their house because of, e.g., unemployment.
Looking at these transaction costs, we may conclude that the housing market institutions
variables perform more or less conform expectations. Especially, high transfer tax and real estate
agent’s fees decrease the probability to change jobs signiﬁcantly and have a corresponding effect
on the hazard rate. Taxation on moving residence substantially reduce labour mobility. In this
case each percentage point of taxation causes a risk reduction of 2% into a new job, 1% into
unemployment and 5% into the out-of-labour force after taking the indirect effect through the
housing model into account. Thus, with high taxation of each housing transaction, home-owners
face substantial moving costs and reduce thus their geographical mobility. This effect causes
their hazard rates out of employment to decrease. Note that this taxation effect is remarkably
similar to the effect of home-ownership.
The variables ‘Language diversity’ and ‘Religion diversity’ were hypothesised to negatively
affect job mobility because they hamper geographical mobility. However, especially the
coefﬁcients for ‘Language diversity’ do not conﬁrm such a hypothesis. It may be that these
variables pick up some unobserved country speciﬁc effects like the generosity of the welfare
system or the importance of the social rented sector. The variable ‘Religion diversity’ show that
countries that score high on this scale (Belgium, Spain, Italy, France) face higher risks out of
employment, regardless of the exit destination. Countries with a high diversity in religion (like
the UK, Germany and the Netherlands) show more job-to-job transitions, but lower hazards into
unemployment or the out-of-labour force. Here, there seems to be some kind of European
North-South division at work, rather then that these variables actually measure moving costs
related to religion or language variety. As mentioned above, most other coefﬁcients are conform
intuition and have the (intuitively) right sign. First, consider the housing model. Transfer taxes,
including real estate agent fees, reduces the probability to be home-owner. The country-speciﬁc
home-ownership rate increases the probability of home-ownership and probably captures
country-speciﬁc unobserved effects in the inclination to buy a house. As could be expected, the
dummy for interest deduction on income tax is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that such
policy measures might indeed lead to higher home-ownership rates.
9 Risk into the out-of-labour force is somewhat inconsistent across studies. In our case, the coefﬁcient is (marginally)
signiﬁcantly negative. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004), e.g., ﬁnd for the Netherlands that the coefﬁent is insigniﬁcantly
positive. In any case, the coefﬁcient is small, pointing to the limited effect of home-ownership in leaving the labour force.
31Age tends to increase the probability on home-ownership just as being male, educated and
having an employed spouse. Living together with an (unemployed) partner reduces
home-ownership, while having (older) children increases this probability again. The latter is
probably a proxy for a life-cycle effect, where individuals have a higher home-ownership rate at
a later age. Finally, we consider language and religion diversity. The former increase the
probability to be home-owner insigniﬁcantly, while the latter increases substantially
home-ownership rates. These effects are a bit more difﬁcult to explain, although it seems that the
protestant countries, such as the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, favour home-ownership,
while countries with many dialects, such as Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium hamper
home-ownership. However, again, we have to be careful here, because these variables may pick
up an unobserved country-speciﬁc effect like the generosity of the welfare system, and its
accompanying large social renting system.
The hazard rate for job-to-job transitions is declining with age, which is understandable
because younger workers are more mobile on the labour market. The same accounts for the
probability to enter unemployment. However, hazard rates into non-participation seems to rise
again for older workers (with an age above 45). Females seem to have in general higher hazard
rates out of employment than men; where females tend to end up as non-participant (their risk is
about 88% higher). Higher educational levels results in a smaller hazard into another job or
unemployment, although education does not affect the probability to become a non-participant
very much. Having an employed spouse or living with a partner diminishes the risk of changing
jobs or becoming unemployed. Again, the effect on leaving the labour force is less clear. Finally,
having older children increases the probability of changing jobs, becoming unemployed or
leaving the labour force. This might again point to a life-cycle effect.
The piecewise constant speciﬁcation for duration dependence gives consistent and intuitively
appealing outcomes. After the ﬁrst year, all hazard rates out of employment drop signiﬁcantly
and continue falling with the employee’s job duration. Finally, we turn to the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution. All mass points are positive and very signicant. Most probability
mass is assigned to the combination with low exit rates and a high probability on owning a
home. Interestingly, only a small part of our population – around 23% – face higher exit rates
out of their current job. The current estimation where seven segments are used show that two
segments make up for almost 65% of all individuals.10 The actual allocation of the probabilities
to the segments depend upon the number of segments and the initial starting point of the
algorithm, but experiments show that all combinations converge to the same loglikelihood and
that the largest group is usually the segment that contains all favorable mass points (thus the one
denoted as G = {1,0,0,0}).)
10 Actually, estimations with only two segments – one with all mass points and one with no mass points, result in almost
the same log-likelihood and coefﬁcient estimates.
325.2 Discussion
The most intriguing ﬁnding from Table 5.1 is that some housing market institutions, such as the
transfer tax on moving residence, negatively affect both the probability to own a house and the
mobility on the labour market. This entails that, e.g., the transfer tax affect the labour market
directly and indirectly. Directly via the negative effect on home-ownership rates and indirectly
via the negative effect on labour market mobility. The latter effect is caused by the increase in
(monetary) transaction costs when changing local labour markets.
Therefore, it is interesting to look at the impact of both direct and indirect effects of our
housing market institutions as listed in Table 5.1. To do so, we ﬁrst look at the separate country
speciﬁc effects of individual home-ownership. Table 5.2 reports these effects in terms of
percentage risk change.11
Table 5.2 Impact of home-ownership on labour mobility across European countries (%)a
Employment Impact on the risk on Non-participation
unemployment
Country %
Germany 7 − 48 10
Denmark 2 − 25 − 62
Netherlands − 108 − 99 -
Belgium 2 − 102 25
Luxembourg − 78 − 175 − 46
France − 35 − 32 13
United Kingdom − 67 − 53 − 16
Ireland − 20 − 52 − 20
Italy 22 − 36 40
Greece 1 34 − 28
Spain 10 33 21
Portugal − 55 − 49 − 51
Austria − 12 − 41 − 47
Finland − 7 17 16
a signiﬁcant at 5% in bold
Clearly, there are some differences between European countries but the overall result seems to be
rather consistent. Home-ownership has a negative impact on the job-to-job transition rate and on
the changes of getting unemployed or becoming a non-participant. Noteworthy exceptions are
Spain, Greece and Italy, where in the former two countries home-ownership leads to higher
job-to-unemployment transition rates and in the latter country home-ownership has a positive
impact on the rate of changing jobs or leaving the labour force. The effects of home-ownership
11 Basically, these effects are derived from a similar estimation as shown in Table 5.1, but then with country speciﬁc
individual home-ownership effects instead of generic individual home-ownership effects.
33are rather high in countries like The Netherlands, Luxembourg, The United Kingdom and
Portugal, although a real geographical pattern is difﬁcult to discern.
Focussing on the relation between unemployment and the national home-ownership rate,
Figure 5.2 depicts the relation between the country speciﬁc individual home-ownership effect on
the risk on unemployment and the national home-ownership rate.12
Figure 5.2 Relation between country speciﬁc effects on the risk on unemployment and aggregate home-
ownership.
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Interestingly, Figure 5.2 shows the same relationship as found by macroeconomic reseach (such
as in, e.g. Oswald, 1997, 1999). So it seems that the variation in country speciﬁc unemployment
rates is not caused by individual home-ownership per se, but instead by country speciﬁc factors.
Indeed, if we take into account our housing market variables (transfer tax, religion and language
variables) as well – as in Figure 5.3 –, then the relation between these country speciﬁc effects
together with the housing market institutions and aggegrate home-ownership becomes even
stronger (the R2 more than doubles).
Obviously, both Figures 5.2 and 5.3 depict mere correlations instead of causal effects. However,
using our microeconomic results it is possible to mimic the macroeconomic results of Oswald.
12 The national home-ownership rate is measured here as the mean national home-ownership rate taken over the period
1994–2001.
34Figure 5.3 Relation between country speciﬁc effects together with housing market institutions on the risk on
unemployment and aggregate home-ownership.
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Our results suggest that – although home-ownership causes workers to be less mobile on the
labour market – country speciﬁc factors and especially housing market institutions causes both a
decrease in national home-ownership rates as well as a decrease in labour market mobility
leading to a seemingly causal relation between unemployment and home-ownership rates.
To a certain extent, this result should carry over to research at the regional level, as long as
the regions under consideration are larger than local labour markets. However, national housing
market institutions, such as the taxation on buying a house, stop playing a role at the regional
level. Thus, one may predict that the relation between aggregate home-ownership and
unemployment decreases – and ﬁnally may even becomes negative as our individual empirical
results suggest – when looking at a more detailed spatial level.
Admittedly, our research focuses solely on home-owners. However, workers that rent from
governmental of non-proﬁt organisations may face substantial transaction costs as well –
especially when this (social) renting market is very tight. In this case, the sign of these
transaction costs is not directly clear. Do they increase when the social renting market increases,
because of, e.g., a tighter and less mobile housing market or do they decrease because of an
increasing ease in ﬁnding a new residence? Experiences from the Netherlands and the UK at
least suggest the ﬁrst relationship, which would mean that large social renting sectors increase
both aggregate and individual unemployment rates.
35366 Conclusion
From the micro-econometric literature, the conclusion can be drawn that home-ownership
diminishes unemployment by decreasing the probability to become unemployed. From the
macro-econometric literature it follows that aggregate home-ownership increases
unemployment, mainly due to decreased ﬂexibility of housing markets. home-ownership
impedes labour mobility between regions. In this paper, we are able to reconcile these two
contradictory outcomes by focusing on transaction costs in the housing market instead of
home-ownership rates. We show that transaction costs impede labour mobility, but also diminish
the attractiveness of becoming home-owner.
Our microeconomic competing risk model clearly shows that – in line with previous research
– home-ownership reduces labour mobility. Thus, home-owners have lower exit rates to any
destination out of their current job spell. However, there are other variables, i.e. housing
institutions, that play an inﬂuential role as well. These housing institutions, like transaction costs
are usually country (or region) speciﬁc and affect both home-ownership incidence and labour
market mobility. Firstly, housing markets institutions, such as transaction costs, might hamper
the ease of buying a house. Secondly, they also create obstacles for workers to move residence,
because of, e.g., ﬁnding a more suitable job in a different local labour market, and thus reduce
labour market mobility. This means that from a macroeconomic perspective countries with
higher home-ownership rates may coincide with countries with higher unemployment rates,
because actual transaction costs for moving in those countries are higher (transaction costs of
home-owners tend to be higher than that of renters). However, this relation is not driven by
home-ownership but mostly by the direct effect of transaction costs on the housing market and
on labour mobility.
Another contribution of this paper to the literature is the overview it gives of the differences
between European countries. The effects of home-ownership seems to be lowest for the northern
European countries: Denmark and Finland. Especially strong effects of individual
home-ownership can be found in countries such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Luxembourg and
the UK. For southern European countries, such as Spain and Greece, home-ownership has even a
positive impact on the risk on unemployment.
Finally, from this paper follows a clear policy implication for Europe. Labour markets will
become more ﬂexible by diminishing the transfer tax on moving residence. Reduced transfer
taxes enhance the attractiveness for the unemployed to search outside their local area for jobs,
and will encourage employees to change jobs.
3738Appendix A The EM algorithm
Since a direct application of the maximum likelihood to a mixing distribution is – at least
theoretically – not feasible, we apply the EM algorithm to ﬁt the mixture distribution. Originally
the EM procedure has been proposed by Dempster et al. (1977) to control for missing data, but
the procedure seems to be particularly well equipped to deal with ﬁnite mixtures (see, e.g., Guo
and Rodriguez, 1992, for an application of an EM algorithm in a duration framework).
The procedure proceeds as follows. Suppose we want to ﬁt a mixture distribution with K
support points leading to a total number of M combinations of segments.13 These segments have
unknown values drawn from a certain probability distribution, say ν1,...,νM, to which unknown
probabilities, π1,...,πM, are attached. Now, for each individual, introduce a vector of indicator
variables, zi = (zi1,...,ziM), where zim takes the value 1 if individual i is associated with the
m-th segment, else it is zero. Thus, zi has a multinomial distribution with parameters π, or:
f(zi|π) =
M
Õ
m=1
πzim
m , (A.1)
Now denote the individual combined likelihood of the competing risk model with the housing
tenure model as L∗
i (φ), then, if zi would have been observed, individual i would contribute to the
log-likelihood (apart from the multiple spells) as follows:
logLi(π,ν,φ) =
M
å
m=1
zim[log(πk)+logL∗
i (φ,ν)]. (A.2)
In the expectation step (E), we ﬁrst estimate the cluster probabilities for each individual (cf.
Leisch, 2004). Thus, the probability that individual i belongs to segment m is:
ˆ zim =
πmlogL∗
i (φ,νm)
å
M
k=1πk logL∗
i (φ,νk)
. (A.3)
The ˆ zim’s are evaluated at current parameter estimates and can be plugged in in the
log-likelihood function (A.2).
The maximisation step (M) now consists of estimating the parameter vectors ν, φ, and π.
The ﬁrst two can be found, e.g, by applying conventional maximum likelihood procedures to:
logLi(ν,φ) =
M
å
m=1
zim[logL∗
i (φ,ν)]. (A.4)
And the vector π = (π1,...,πM) can easily be found by:
ˆ πm =
1
N
N
å
i=1
ˆ zim. (A.5)
The E- and M-steps are repeated until the log-likelihood of (A.2) stops improving.
13 In our case, we have a maximum of (K−1)×4 support points.
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